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Andrea Guardo 
 
In Kripke’s (1981) reading, the gist of the pars destruens of Wittgenstein’s (1953) 
remarks on rule-following is that no “truth conditions” or “corresponding facts” in 
the world exist that make a meaning ascription, a statement like “Jones means ad-
dition by “+””, true. Such a view sounds, no doubt, quite puzzling. For one thing, 
it sounds pragmatically self-refuting: at least prima facie, saying that no truth 
conditions exist that make a meaning ascription true is saying that there are no 
meaning facts, no such things as Jones’ meaning addition by “+” or the fact that 
“Es regnet” means It rains, and (usually) one cannot use the sentence “There are 
no meaning facts” to make a true assertion – since a sentence can be used to make 
an assertion only if it has a meaning, or so it would seem.
1
 It should therefore 
come as no surprise that, in Kripke’s reading, Wittgenstein himself tried to make 
his view less unpalatable. This attempt is, in my view, largely on the right track.
2
 
Against it, however, a host of objections have been raised. In this paper, I want to 
answer one of these objections, which McDowell (1984, p. 222) phrases as fol-
lows: 
 
The idea at risk is the idea of things being thus and so anyway, whether or 
not we choose to investigate the matter in question, and whatever the out-
come of any such investigation. That idea requires the conception of how 
things could correctly be said to be anyway – whatever, if anything, we in 
fact go on to say about the matter; and this notion of correctness can only be 
the notion of how the pattern of application that we grasp, when we come to 
understand the concept in question, extends, independently of the actual 
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1
 Note that, contrary appearances notwithstanding, saying that there are no meaning facts 
is not necessarily pragmatically self-refuting in Kölbel’s (2011, pp. 12-13) sense. Accord-
ing to Kölbel’s definition, a sentence is necessarily pragmatically self-refuting if and only 
if one can never use it to make a true assertion; and there are certain non-standard con-
texts, e.g. when I am talking about another possible world, in which “There are no mean-
ing facts” (and, for that matter, also Kölbel’s example, “I am not saying anything”) can 
be used to make a true assertion. 
2
 I want to stress, however, that I think there is at least one other absolutely legitimate 
way to deal with Kripkenstein’s thesis, namely substituting (what I believe is) the com-
mon-sense, in some sense normative, notion of meaning with a purely descriptive one. 
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outcome of any investigation, to the relevant case. So if the notion of inves-
tigation-independent patterns of application is to be discarded, then so is the 
idea that things are, at least sometimes, thus and so anyway, independently 
of our ratifying the judgment that that is how they are. It seems fair to de-
scribe this extremely radical consequence as a kind of idealism.
3, 4
 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 is devoted to giving a clear 
enough presentation of McDowell’s objection. In particular, I try to make clear, 
first, what seems to support the contention that in Kripkenstein’s view there is no 
room for “a notion of how the pattern of application that we grasp extends inde-
pendently of the actual outcome of any investigation” and, therefore, no room for 
“a conception of how things could correctly be said to be anyway” and, second, 
the exact nature of the transition from this thesis to the notion that Kripkenstein is 
committed to a form of subjective idealism – I stress “subjective” because 
McDowell regards himself as an objective idealist, à la Hegel. In section 2 I turn 
to the task of sketching the theoretical apparatus needed to answer McDowell’s 
objection in the best possible way. Introducing this apparatus, however, will also 
give me the opportunity, first, to further clarify both Kripkenstein’s view of mean-
ing ascriptions and its consequences for language in general and, second, to build 
a bridge between the rule-following literature and the contemporary debate on rel-
ativism. Finally, in section 3 I explain why Kripkenstein’s conception of meaning 
talk does not entail any kind of subjective idealism, thereby answering McDow-
ell’s argument. 
  
                                                 
3
 McDowell’s primary target in this passage is the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s re-
marks put forward in Wright 1980; however, the way McDowell introduces Kripke’s 
reading later in the paper suggests that he thinks that the objection applies to 
Kripkenstein’s case, too. If I read the relevant passage correctly, basically the same objec-
tion is raised also in Wright 1987, p. 122. That being said, whether Wright’s objection is 
really McDowell’s is secondary. In fact, it is secondary also whether Kripkenstein is real-
ly one of the targets of McDowell’s objection. What matters is that it is rather natural to 
think that McDowell’s objection is a problem for Kripkenstein’s position; and, in fact, 
this is an objection which, while discussing Kripke’s reading, I have heard countless 
times. 
4
 McDowell also argues that a view such as Kripkenstein’s implies that “for the commu-
nity itself there is no possibility of error”; for my answer to this objection see Guardo 
2012a, pp. 382-383; for a parallel answer to a parallel objection see MacFarlane 2014, § 
2.1.3. 
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1. Relativism and Idealism 
According to the received view, the truth value of the proposition expressed by an 
utterance of, say, “Jones means addition by “+”” depends on the ontological status 
of the corresponding state of affairs, which Kripke (see, e.g., 1981, p. 8) some-
times describes as a “grasping”, on Jones’ part, of the rule of addition in such a 
way that, although Jones has computed only finitely many sums in the past, the 
rule determines his answer for indefinitely many new sums that he has never pre-
viously considered. If this state of affairs holds, if it is a fact,
5
 the proposition is 
true. If it does not, the proposition is false. The negative part of Kripkenstein’s ar-
gument questions this common wisdom and culminates with the conclusion that 
no state of affairs corresponds to an utterance of a meaning ascription. Focusing 
on the positive case: “[…] no “truth conditions” or “corresponding facts” in the 
world exist that make a statement like “Jones, like many of us, means addition by 
“+”” true” (Kripke 1981, p. 86). Therefore, it seems that – unless we are willing, 
unlike Kripkenstein, to get rid of the idea that the content of a meaning ascription 
is truth evaluable – we must accept that the truth values of the propositions in 
question depend on something other than “truth conditions”. The question is: on 
what? 
Kripkenstein’s answer is nicely summarized in the following passage: 
 
Jones is entitled, subject to correction by others, provisionally to say “I 
mean addition by “+”” whenever he has the feeling of confidence – “now I 
can go on!” – that he can give “correct” responses in new cases; and he is 
entitled, again provisionally and subject to correction by others, to judge a 
new response to be “correct” simply because it is the response he is inclined 
to give. These inclinations […] are to be regarded as primitive. They are not 
to be justified in terms of Jones’s ability to interpret his own intentions or 
anything else. But Smith need not accept Jones’s authority on these matters: 
Smith will judge Jones to mean addition by “+” only if he judges that 
Jones’s answers to particular addition problems agree with those he is in-
clined to give, or, if they occasionally disagree, he can interpret Jones as at 
least following the proper procedure […] (Kripke 1981, pp. 90-91). 
 
Some might want to object that in this passage Kripke is not explaining when P is 
true, but just when one is entitled to assert it. This is, after all, the language em-
ployed in the passage. And, so the objection goes, this is the reading most con-
                                                 
5
 The distinction between facts and states of affairs (according to which a state of affairs 
is a fact if and only if it holds) is, I think, a useful one. In what follows, however, I will 
sometimes employ Kripke’s terminology and use “fact” in the more general sense of state 
of affairs. 
Synthese, forthcoming 
 4 
sistent with the claim that “[…] Wittgenstein proposes a picture of language 
based, not on truth conditions, but on assertability conditions or justification con-
ditions […]” (Kripke 1981, p. 74). This is, I think, a misreading of these passages. 
Kripkenstein rejects a picture of language based on truth conditions only in the 
sense that he rejects the notion that linguistic meaning can be accounted for in 
terms of “corresponding states of affairs” on whose ontological status the truth 
value of (the proposition expressed by an utterance of) a sentence depends. In 
Kripke’s sense, truth conditions are just these states of affairs. In a passage I have 
already quoted, for example, he writes: “[…] no “truth conditions” or “corre-
sponding facts” in the world exist that make a statement like “Jones, like many of 
us, means addition by “+”” true” (Kripke 1981, p. 86).6 This is in no sense reject-
ing the notion of truth. At most, it is rejecting a particular account of this notion. 
In fact, it is well known – and Kripke himself stresses it – that, far from rejecting 
truth talk, Wittgenstein (see, e.g., 1953, § 136) thought that the concept of truth is 
perfectly unproblematic. Hence, when Kripke says that Wittgenstein proposes a 
picture of language based on assertability conditions, what he means is not that 
truth has no place in Wittgenstein’s metasemantics; all he means is that truth con-
ditions play no role in Wittgenstein’s view of language. Likewise, the fact that, in 
the passage I quoted, Kripke frames his discussion in terms of what one is entitled 
to assert does not mean that his point has nothing to do with truth; Kripke’s choice 
of words should rather be seen as a way to stress that things like Jones’ having the 
feeling of confidence that he can give “correct” responses in new cases are not to 
be conceived as truth conditions in the sense defined above. 
If this is correct, it seems apt to describe Kripkenstein’s views about meaning 
ascriptions as a form of “non-factualism”, in the sense that (the proposition ex-
pressed by an utterance of) a meaning ascription is not made true (false) by the 
occurrence (non-occurrence) of the corresponding state of affairs.
7
 The notion that 
Kripkenstein is a non-factualist in something like this sense, however, is not un-
controversial; for example, George Wilson (1998), criticizing McDowell’s render-
                                                 
6
 See also what Kripke (1981, p. 87) says about necessary and sufficient conditions and 
straight solutions. 
7
 This is not, of course, the sense of “non-factualism” used by some of Kripke’s commen-
tators. For example, Kusch (2006, p. 148), following Boghossian (see, e.g., 1989, § 16), 
defines non-factualism by saying that “A non-factualist about a certain class of declara-
tive sentences denies that they are “truth-apt” or “fact-apt”: he denies that for any sen-
tence s of this class we can infer “s is true” or “It is a fact that s” from s”, while in my 
sense of the word there is no inconsistency in maintaining that a certain class of declara-
tive sentences, though non-factual, still are truth-apt. For a criticism of the idea that 
Kripkenstein is a non-factualist in the Boghossian-Kusch sense see Soames 1998, §§ 4 
and 5. 
Synthese, forthcoming 
5 
ing of Kripkenstein’s position, has argued that what Kripkenstein rejects is not 
that meaning ascriptions are made true by the occurrence of the corresponding 
states of affairs, but just a certain picture of these states of affairs: the picture 
whereby, to stick to Kripke’s example, the state of affairs which corresponds to 
“Jones means addition by “+”” is a “grasping”, on Jones’ part, of the rule of addi-
tion in such a way that the rule determines his answer for indefinitely many new 
sums that he has never previously considered (see also Byrne 1996, p. 342). 
The difference between the non-factualist interpretation and Wilson’s can be 
made clear by focusing on the different roles that the two readings give to the 
agreement between Jones’s answers to particular addition problems and Smith’s. 
On the one hand, Wilson is committed to the thesis that Kripkenstein takes this 
agreement to be the fact that corresponds to the proposition Smith expresses when 
he utters the words “Jones means addition by “+”” and on whose ontological sta-
tus the truth value of this meaning ascription depends. On the other hand, on the 
non-factualist interpretation this agreement cannot even be said to be the fact that 
corresponds to the proposition in question. First, the fact that Jones’s answers to 
particular addition problems agree with those Smith is inclined to give (“F”, for 
short) is not, as it were, “represented” by the proposition Smith expresses when he 
utters the words “Jones means addition by “+”” (“P”, for short); F does not consti-
tute Jones’ meaning addition by “+” – on the non-factualist interpretation, nothing 
does. Second, even if F could be said to be represented by P, it would still be false 
that F is the fact that P represents; after all, when it is Williams who utters the 
words “Jones means addition by “+””, thereby expressing P, F’s role is played by 
another state of affairs, namely the fact that Jones’s answers to particular addition 
problems agree with those Williams is inclined to give. 
Both the non-factualist and the factualist interpretation find at least some sup-
port in what Kripke says. Here I will not try to adjudicate the debate; in what fol-
lows I assume the non-factualist reading mainly because that is the reading on 
which McDowell’s objection relies, and I think I can show that even if we grant 
McDowell this assumption his argument does not go through. That being said, I 
think that the non-factualist interpretation is far more plausible than the factualist 
one, and it will be useful to say something more about this issue; before doing 
that, however, we must discuss a couple of consequences of the non-factualist 
reading. 
As a general rule, non-factualism goes hand in hand with deflationism about 
truth and relativism (see, e.g., Azzouni and Bueno 2008, pp. 757-758 and Kölbel 
2008, pp. 375-376). It should therefore come as no surprise that, on the non-
factualist reading, Kripkenstein is also committed to a form of relativism about 
meaning ascriptions, as well as to a deflationist conception of truth. As for 
deflationism, Kripke himself (1981, p. 86) is quite explicit: “[…] Wittgenstein ac-
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cepts the “redundancy” theory of truth: to affirm that a statement is true (or pre-
sumably, to precede it with “It is a fact that…”) is simply to affirm the statement 
itself, and to say it is not true is to deny it […]”.8 As for relativism, the issue is a 
bit more complicated, but not that much. As I have already noted, Wilson is 
committed to the thesis that Kripkenstein takes the agreement between Jones and 
Smith to be the fact that corresponds to the proposition Smith expresses when he 
utters the words “Jones means addition by “+””. But, mutatis mutandis, the same 
has to hold for the agreement between Jones and Williams, which must be the fact 
that corresponds to the proposition Williams expresses when she utters the words 
“Jones means addition by “+””. This shows that Wilson is also committed to the – 
no doubt revisionist – thesis that, in Kripkenstein’s view, the proposition Smith 
expresses when he utters the sentence “Jones means addition by “+”” is not the 
one Williams expresses when she utters those same words. Not so for the advo-
cates of the non-factualist reading, who can stick to the notion that when they ut-
ter the words “Jones means addition by “+”” Smith and Williams express the 
same proposition, P. Let us now suppose, however, that while the answers to par-
ticular addition problems Smith is inclined to give agree with Jones’, Williams’ 
do not. What we have, then, is that P is true relative to Smith and false relative to 
Williams; and this is definitely a form of relativism, at least in a rather broad 
sense of the word. 
Note, however, that such a relativism can take one of either two forms. Accord-
ing to the strong version, P is true relative to Smith and false relative to Williams, 
with neither perspective having any claim to being the “correct” one. According 
to the weak version, P is ‒ again ‒ true relative to Smith and false relative to Wil-
liams, but when P is evaluated qua expressed by Smith the relevant perspective is 
his, while when P is evaluated qua expressed by Williams the relevant perspective 
is hers. The weak version would come out as a form of relativism on some ac-
counts of the notion (e.g. Kölbel 2004’s), but not on others (e.g. MacFarlane 
2014’s); however, I take it to be clear that, on a broad enough understanding of 
the concept, both the strong and the weak version deserve the label “relativism”. 
The weak version has been ascribed to Wittgenstein by Voltolini (2010); as for 
Kripke’s Wittgenstein, I take both readings to be reasonable, even though I favor 
the strong one; that being said, in the remainder of the paper I will not take a stand 
                                                 
8
 For a criticism of Kripke’s reading see Putnam 1994, pp. 66-69. Kripke’s Wittgenstein 
is a deflationist about truth in general; however, it is worth stressing that, just as non-
factualism and relativism, deflationism can be a local matter – see, e.g., Kölbel 2008, §§ 
1-3. To borrow Azzouni’s (2010, p. 79) turn of phrase: “true” can be argued to be “[…] 
neutral between ontically relevant and ontically irrelevant usages” – see also Azzouni 
2007, pp. 204-205. 
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on this issue; what matters is just that Kripkenstein can be viewed as a relativist in 
one of these two senses. 
But can he? One might be skeptical. Consider, for instance, the two following 
passages, the first of which almost immediately follows the one I quoted at the 
beginning of this section: 
 
[…] if we were reduced to a babble of disagreement, with Smith and Jones 
asserting of each other that they are following the rule wrongly, while others 
disagreed with both and with each other, there would be little point to the 
practice just described. In fact, our actual community is (roughly) uniform 
in its practices with respect to addition. Any individual who claims to have 
mastered the concept of addition will be judged by the community to have 
done so if his particular responses agree with those of the community in 
enough cases […] (Kripke 1981, pp. 91-92). 
The entire “game” we have described – that the community attributes a con-
cept to an individual so long as he exhibits sufficient conformity, under test 
circumstances, to the behavior of the community – would lose its point out-
side a community that generally agrees in its practices. […] On Wittgen-
stein’s conception, such agreement is essential for our game of ascribing 
rules and concepts to each other […] (Kripke 1981, p. 96). 
 
Such passages show, first, that my discussion of the Jones-Smith-Williams case 
should be slightly modified to take into account the role that Kripkenstein gives to 
the community. So let us do that and provide both Smith and Williams with a 
community that agrees with their respective judgments about Jones, and let us re-
phrase accordingly the relativist upshot of the non-factualist reading of 
Kripkenstein’s view: if the answers to particular addition problems that Smith’s 
community is inclined to give agree with Jones’, and those of Williams’ commu-
nity do not, then the proposition Jones means addition by “+” is true relative to 
Smith’s community and false relative to Williams’. So far, so good. However, one 
might try to argue that the above passages show something more and that, in fact, 
they are inconsistent with the non-factualist reading and the relativism it leads to. 
One might try to argue, more precisely, that such passages suggest that when we 
assess the proposition in question for truth or falsity only one community is rele-
vant, namely Jones’ – which, of course, may be identical with Smith’s, or with 
Williams’, but not with both. The fact that Jones’ answers to particular addition 
Synthese, forthcoming 
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problems agree with his community’s just is the fact that he means addition by 
“+”.9 
Well, let us say that such passages actually suggest what the objection in ques-
tion has them suggesting. That would be evidence for some factualist interpreta-
tion of Kripkenstein’s view and, ipso facto, against the non-factualist/relativist 
reading. There is, however, also plenty of evidence for the non-factualist/relativist 
reading and against factualist interpretations. Here I will focus on two points. 
First, consider the passage that follows: 
 
Wittgenstein’s theory should not be confused with a theory that, for any m 
and n, the value of the function we mean by “plus”, is (by definition) the 
value that (nearly) all the linguistic community would give as the answer. 
[…] The theory would assert that 125 is the value of the function meant for 
given arguments, if and only if “125” is the response nearly everyone would 
give, given these arguments. Thus the theory would be a social, or commu-
nity-wide, version of the dispositional theory, and would be open to at least 
some of the same criticisms as the original form. I take Wittgenstein to deny 
that he holds such a view […] (Kripke 1981, p. 111). 
 
Here Kripke explicitly denies that Wittgenstein’s view was that the (alleged) fact 
that the function Jones means by “+” takes the value 125 for the arguments 68 and 
57 can be identified with the fact that “125” is the answer most of the members of 
Jones’ community would give to the problem “68 + 57”, which immediately en-
tails a commitment by Kripke to denying that Wittgenstein’s view was that the 
(alleged) fact that Jones means addition by “+” can be identified with facts about 
his community’s (and his) linguistic behavior. I do not see how this can be made 
                                                 
9
 [Readers might prefer to come back to this footnote after having read section 2 and the 
first paragraph of section 3] Such a view of meaning ascriptions is neither a form of 
nonindexical contextualism nor a form of truth-value relativism – in fact, it is none of the 
six views I describe in section 3. It resembles nonindexical contextualism and truth-value 
relativism in that it holds that the circumstances of evaluation relative to which the prop-
osition expressed by a meaning ascription should be assessed for truth or falsity vary with 
context; however, here the relevant context is neither the context in which the meaning 
ascription (e.g. “The meaning of Jones’ utterance of “68 + 57 = 125” is M”) was uttered 
nor that in which it is assessed, but – rather – that in which the utterance the meaning as-
cription makes reference to (e.g. Jones’ utterance of “68 + 57 = 125”) was produced – the 
view is therefore akin to Stanley’s (2005) interest-relative invariantism about knowledge 
and Street’s (2008) constructivism about practical reasons. Note, however, that this posi-
tion entails – not for meaning ascriptions but for language in general – a view which I do 
describe in section 3, namely the ambiguity theory. 
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consistent with the factualist reading sketched above. Second, remember what 
Kripke says about the case of Robinson Crusoe: 
 
What is […] denied is what might be called the “private model” of rule fol-
lowing, that the notion of a person following a given rule is to be analyzed 
simply in terms of facts about the rule follower and the rule follower alone, 
without reference to his membership in a wider community. […] Does this 
mean that Robinson Crusoe, isolated on an island, cannot be said to follow 
any rules, no matter what he does? I do not see that this follows. What does 
follow is that if we think of Crusoe as following rules, we are taking him in-
to our community and applying our criteria for rule following to him. The 
falsity of the private model need not mean that a physically isolated individ-
ual cannot be said to follow rules; rather that an individual, considered in 
isolation […], cannot be said to do so (Kripke 1981, pp. 109-110). 
 
Here Kripke comes very close to saying explicitly that when we assess proposi-
tions such as Crusoe follows the rule of addition and Crusoe means addition for 
truth or falsity Crusoe’s community does not have any privileged role; after all, 
Crusoe can even lack a community! I do not see how this can be made consistent 
with the factualist reading sketched above. Moreover, the idea that what matters is 
that “we are taking Crusoe into our community” strongly suggests that when we 
assess such propositions for truth or falsity all communities are on a par; after all, 
any community can take Crusoe into itself. And this is exactly the point of the 
non-factualist/relativist reading. 
To be clear, I am not saying that such remarks provide conclusive reasons for 
embracing the non-factualist/relativist interpretation or that they should convince 
everyone ‒ even though they did convince me. The goal was just that of showing 
that the non-factualist/relativist interpretation is a plausible one and, therefore, 
McDowell’s objection ‒ which presupposes it ‒ cannot be dismissed out of 
hand.
10, 11
 Let us now turn to this objection. 
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 The question I started with was whether Kripkenstein can be viewed as a relativist ‒ in 
one of the two senses I described above. Since the notion that Kripkenstein is a relativist 
was a straightforward consequence of the non-factualist reading, I answered the question 
by providing evidence in support of that reading. As I see it, the evidence I provided out-
weighs any evidence for the factualist reading; however ‒ lest some reader be distracted 
by what, after all, is a side issue ‒ let me remind you of the dialectic. McDowell takes 
Kripkenstein to be a non-factualist about meaning (in fact, McDowell is the primary tar-
get of Wilson’s polemic against the non-factualist interpretation) and his argument pre-
supposes such a reading. My goal is to show that even if we grant McDowell this as-
sumption, his argument does not go through. Therefore, I do not have to prove that the 
Synthese, forthcoming 
 10 
The relativism Kripkenstein is committed to if he is really a non-factualist is 
clearly a local one: the propositions whose truth values are claimed to be relative 
are just those expressed by meaning ascriptions and related constructions. How-
ever, if McDowell is right, this local relativism entails a global one, which in turn 
entails a form of subjective idealism. I will start with a regimentation of what I 
take to be McDowell’s argument; afterwards, I will say something to help the 
reader see McDowell’s original version of the argument (the one I quoted at the 
beginning of the paper) through mine. Here is my regimentation: 
 
First premise: Kripkenstein maintains that the proposition expressed by an 
utterance of a meaning ascription (e.g. a sentence of the form “Utterance U 
has meaning M”) is true only relative to, say, a perspective. 
Second premise: the proposition that p is true if and only if p. 
First lemma: Kripkenstein is committed to the idea that an utterance has a 
given meaning only relative to a perspective. 
Third premise: an utterance’s correctness depends, at least in part, on its 
meaning. 
Second lemma: Kripkenstein is committed to the idea that an utterance is 
correct only relative to a perspective. 
                                                                                                                                     
non-factualist reading is correct; all I have to show is that it is a plausible interpretation of 
Kripke’s remarks ‒ and that, therefore, McDowell’s argument cannot be ignored. 
11
 An anonymous reviewer for this journal noted that the factualism I described above 
(according to which when we assess the proposition Jones means addition by “+” for 
truth or falsity the only relevant community is Jones’) is much more intuitive than the 
non-factualism of McDowell’s Kripkenstein. This is, I think, correct. Consider, e.g., the 
word “prima” ‒ which, I am told, means excellent in German and a number of things (e.g. 
before), but never excellent, in Italian ‒ and suppose that the proposition we are assessing 
for truth or falsity is By “prima”, Üter means excellent. Saying that, since Üter is Ger-
man, this proposition is true is definitely more intuitive (or at least less counterintuitive) 
than saying that it is true relative to the community of the German speakers and false rela-
tive to that of the Italian speakers. So far, so good. What I deny (and, to be fair, I am not 
sure that the reviewer in question would disagree with me on this) is that this shows that 
the factualist interpretation of Kripke’s essay is more plausible than the non-factualist 
one. Granted, Kripke (1981, e.g. pp. 63-65) stresses that Wittgenstein did not regard him-
self as a skeptic, but he also makes it clear that he does not think that Wittgenstein’s self-
assessment should be taken too seriously (1981, esp. pp. 65-66). I therefore doubt that the 
move from View X is more intuitive than view Y to View X is more likely to be 
Kripkenstein’s than view Y is a valid one. If anything, the fact that a given view does not 
constitute too much of a departure from common sense should, I think, make us wary of 
ascribing it to Kripke’s Wittgenstein. 
Synthese, forthcoming 
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Fourth premise: an utterance of a declarative sentence is correct if and only 
if the proposition it expresses is true. 
Third lemma: Kripkenstein is committed to the idea that a proposition is 
true only relative to a perspective. 
Fifth premise: a state of affairs obtains if and only if the corresponding 
proposition is true.
12
 
Conclusion: Kripkenstein is committed to the idea that a state of affairs ob-
tains only relative to a perspective. 
 
The argument’s first premise is a formulation of the conclusion about 
Kripkenstein’s local relativism which I drew above, while the lemma that straight-
forwardly follows from this premise is my version of the first step of McDowell’s 
own formulation of the argument, namely the claim that in Kripkenstein’s view 
there is no room for “a notion of how the pattern of application that we grasp ex-
tends independently of the actual outcome of any investigation”. One might find 
the latter point a little puzzling, since – at least on the face of it – in the relevant 
passage McDowell does not mention either meanings or relativity to a perspec-
tive. Therefore, let me say something more about the way I read the passage in 
question. 
First, meaning. Saying that in Kripkenstein’s view there is no room for “a no-
tion of how the pattern of application that we grasp extends independently of the 
actual outcome of any investigation” is saying that in Kripkenstein’s view there is 
no room for a robust, objective notion of how a word should be used – given how 
it has been used in the past. But what determines how a word should be used is its 
meaning. Therefore, it seems clear to me that McDowell’s point here can be put in 
terms of meaning. 
As for relativity to a perspective, I take the phrase “independently of the actual 
outcome of any investigation” to suggest that here McDowell is trying to describe 
what he thinks is a form of relativism: the pattern of application that we grasp 
does not extend independently of the actual outcome of any investigation, but only 
relative to such an outcome. This is also how I read qualifications like “whatever, 
if anything, we in fact go on to say about the matter” and the use of the notion of 
investigation, or ratification, dependency: a given way to extend a certain pattern 
of application is correct only relative to a ratification. 
The following passage is, I think, pretty helpful in this connection: 
 
                                                 
12
 Note that I am assuming that for every state of affairs there is a corresponding proposi-
tion, but not that for every proposition there is a corresponding state of affairs: there are, 
of course, propositions that are non-factual. 
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His [i.e. Wright’s] claim is that Wittgenstein seems almost to want to deny 
all substance to the “pattern” idea; what he attributes to Wittgenstein is not 
an outright abandonment of the idea but a reinterpretation of it. Wright’s 
view is that the intuitive contractual picture of meaning and understanding 
can be rendered innocuous – purged of the seductive misconception – by 
discarding the thought that the patterns are independent of our ratification 
(McDowell 1984, p. 223). 
 
Here McDowell seems to want to make clear that the view of Wright’s Wittgen-
stein – which, as I have already mentioned, is the primary target of McDowell’s 
argument – is not that there is absolutely no substance to the idea that words 
should be used in a certain way, but just that the way a word should be used de-
pends on our ratification. And saying that the way a word should be used depends 
on our ratification is just saying that it is relative to it.
13
 
The rest of the argument does not raise any (new) exegetical problems. The se-
cond step of McDowell’s original version of the argument is the claim that in 
Kripkenstein’s view there is no room for “a conception of how things could cor-
rectly be said to be anyway”; the corresponding step in my version is the third 
lemma.
14
 McDowell seems to believe that the transition from the non-objectivity 
of how the pattern of application that we grasp extends to the non-objectivity of 
how things could correctly be said to be is unproblematic. I do not think it is and 
so I made explicit what I believe were that derivation’s intermediate steps. Final-
ly, my version’s conclusion is my gloss of McDowell’s claim that Kripkenstein is 
committed to a form of subjective idealism. 
So much for the exegetical part of the paper. In section 3 I will explain what is 
wrong with McDowell’s argument, but before doing that we need a suitable theo-
                                                 
13
 [Readers unfamiliar with the distinction between contexts of use and contexts of as-
sessment might find this footnote more helpful after having read section 2 – and maybe 
section 3, too] Strictly speaking, saying that the way a word should be used depends on X 
is not yet embracing a form of relativism (at least in MacFarlane’s sense of the word), 
since X might be a feature of the context of use. That being said, there are three reasons 
to believe that, in this case, X is a feature of the context of assessment. First, this is what 
is suggested by the word “ratification”. Second, this seems to be the reading most con-
sistent with the general tenor of Wright’s book. Third, as we have seen, McDowell be-
lieves both that his argument applies also to Kripkenstein’s case and that Kripkenstein is 
a non-factualist about meaning, and – as Azzouni and Bueno have shown – non-
factualism and relativism usually go hand in hand. 
14
 Some might want to argue that the second step of McDowell’s original version of the 
argument should be identified with my regimentation’s second lemma. That might be. 
Anyway, nothing of importance hinges on this point. 
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retical apparatus, which is the topic of the next section. Besides allowing me to 
explain clearly why McDowell’s argument fails, the machinery in question will 
prove itself useful in two other respects, too. First, it will help me explain how 
radical Kripkenstein’s view of language in general is, as well as the difference be-
tween the strong and the weak version of the relativism McDowell ascribes to 
him. Second, it will allow me to build a bridge between the rule-following debate 
and the contemporary literature on context sensitivity, and show that 
Kripkenstein’s view of language in general fills a gap in the logical space of this 
latter literature. 
 
2. A Suitable Theoretical Apparatus 
I will start my discussion of McDowell’s argument by sketching a suitable theo-
retical apparatus, basically equivalent to MacFarlane’s (2014) recent development 
of Kaplan’s (1989b) semantic framework.15 I will then focus on the argument’s 
second lemma. This lemma is the conclusion of the first half of the argument, but 
also the first step of the argument’s second half. However, the second lemma is 
ambiguous, and I will show that the reading that makes the argument’s first half 
sound makes the second one unsound, and vice versa. Either way, the argument 
fails. 
Let a logical form be a lexically and structurally disambiguated sentence (see, 
e.g., Stanley 2000, p. 393).
16
 To each logical form (and, indirectly, to each utter-
ance
17
 of a logical form) is associated a character, a function from contexts
18
 to t-
distributions, which in turn are functions from circumstances of evaluation to truth 
values. A circumstance of evaluation is an n-tuple of relevant features: possible 
worlds, times, standards of taste, and so on; in the simplest case a circumstance of 
                                                 
15
 For a useful complement to MacFarlane’s own defense of his system see Predelli 2012. 
16
 “Logical form” might, of course, be a tad misleading. Another term used in the litera-
ture is “clause” – see, e.g., Predelli 2005, pp. 14-17. 
17
 I speak of utterances only for the sake of simplicity, since I must confess that I sympa-
thize with the Kaplanian idea that, as far as semantic theorizing is concerned, all talk of 
utterances should be replaced by talk of, say, logical forms in context – see, e.g., Predelli 
2005, chapter 3, §§ 3-4, which develops the strategy suggested by Kaplan 1989a, part 2, § 
1. Note that even if it entails a switch from (uses of) tokens to types, such a view is not 
platonistic in nature – for one thing, it is consistent with the metaphysics of words out-
lined in Kaplan 1990. 
18
 The relevant notion of context is a rather technical one – see, e.g., the remarks on con-
texts and indexes in Predelli 2005, pp. 17-18. A quite interesting consequence of the 
adoption of this notion is that the circumstance against which a given logical form in con-
text must be evaluated can be “non-standard” – see, e.g., Predelli 2005, chapter 2, § 5 and 
chapter 3, § 6. 
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evaluation is just a world and the t-distributions are the familiar truth conditions
19,
 
20
 – while we can think of character as the theoretical counterpart of meaning, we 
can think of t-distributions as the theoretical counterparts of propositions.
21
 
As for context, there are three roles it can play. First, context can help us iden-
tify the relevant character and thereby disambiguate the sentence at issue. Second, 
context is sometimes needed to identify the relevant t-distribution. Third, context 
determines the relevant circumstances of evaluation (see, e.g., Kaplan 1989b, p. 
522). There are two kinds of context, the context of use and the context of as-
sessment. The notion of a context of use is pretty standard. This is not so for the 
notion of a context of assessment. However, I do not think that there is any reason 
to be suspicious of this concept: 
 
                                                 
19
 For an influential argument against the idea that the values of a character are not always 
truth conditions see Stanley 2000 and 2002. For a by now classic example of a character 
and its arguments (allegedly) falling short of determining truth conditions see Travis 
1997, §§ 1-3 – in the remainder of the paper Travis draws from his analysis conclusions 
concerning several issues, e.g. Grice’s (see, e.g., 1989) criticism of certain distinctively 
philosophical uses of “what we would not say”; for a sensible analysis of Travis’ example 
see Predelli 2005, chapter 4, §§ 1-5, to which I owe my use of the distinction t-
distributions-truth conditions. For other Travis-friendly examples see Lewis 1979. 
20
 It should be clear that this sense of “truth conditions” is not Kripke’s. For one, while 
Kripke’s truth conditions are facts, truth conditions in the sense at issue here are func-
tions. That being said, the two notions are not unrelated. If there are no truth conditions in 
Kripke’s sense which correspond to a given kind of declarative sentences, then the rele-
vant utterances have no truth conditions in the “functional” sense, and vice versa. By the 
way, this correspondence shows that just as there are two senses in which the utterances 
of a declarative sentence can be said not to have “functional” truth conditions in a robust 
sense (either because their t-distributions are not truth conditions or because which truth 
conditions they express depends on the context of assessment – see below for the lingo), 
there are two senses in which one can say that, strictly speaking, there are no Kripkean 
truth conditions which correspond to a given kind of sentences: either because the facts in 
question do not exist or because which facts correspond to the sentences in question is a 
relative matter. As the next section should make clear, I believe that – if Kripkenstein is 
right – while meaning ascriptions and related constructions lack Kripkean truth condi-
tions also in the first – stronger – sense, all the other kinds of sentences lack Kripkean 
truth conditions only in the second – weaker – sense. 
21
 If you want, you can reserve the word “proposition” for the counterparts of truth condi-
tions and say that t-distributions that are not truth conditions are the theoretical counter-
parts of propositional radicals – in Bach’s (1994) sense. The distinction between proposi-
tions and propositional radicals is basically Recanati’s (2007, p. 5) distinction between 
complete and explicit content. 
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We are already comfortable with the notion of a “context of use”, under-
stood as a possible situation in which a sentence might be used. So we ought 
to be able to make good sense of the notion of a “context of assessment” – a 
possible situation in which a use of a sentence might be assessed. There 
shouldn’t be anything controversial about contexts of assessment: if there 
can be assessments of uses of sentences, then surely we can talk of the con-
texts in which these assessments would occur (MacFarlane 2014, p. 60). 
 
That being said, there is a difference between contexts of use and contexts of as-
sessment that is worth stressing here: 
 
A particular use of a sentence may be assessed from indefinitely many pos-
sible contexts. Thus, although we may talk of “the context of use” for such a 
use, we may not talk in the same way of “the context of assessment”. […] It 
is important that the context of assessment is not fixed in any way by facts 
about the context of use, including the speaker’s intentions; there is no “cor-
rect” context from which to assess a particular speech act (MacFarlane 
2014, pp. 61-62). 
 
I will come back to this difference between contexts of use and contexts of as-
sessment in the next section, for it is necessary to fully understand how radical the 
view of language the non-factualist version of Kripkenstein is committed to is. 
Note, however, that this difference can also help us elucidate a distinction we 
have already met, namely the one between the strong and the weak version of the 
relativism to which, according to the non-factualist reading, Kripkenstein is com-
mitted to. 
According to the strong version of this position, if the answers to particular ad-
dition problems Smith’s community is inclined to give agree with Jones’, while 
those of Williams’ community do not, then the proposition Jones means addition 
by “+” is true relative to Smith’s community and false relative to Williams’, with 
neither perspective having any claim to being the “correct” one. The weak version 
agrees that in such a situation the proposition in question is true relative to 
Smith’s community and false relative to Williams’, but it has that when this prop-
osition is evaluated qua expressed by Smith the relevant perspective is that of his 
community, while when it is evaluated qua expressed by Williams the relevant 
perspective is that of hers. Now, with our theoretical apparatus in place, and keep-
ing in mind the difference between contexts of use and contexts of assessment 
stressed above, it is clear that, even though both versions of the position have that 
there is a dependency of the circumstances of evaluation on the relevant perspec-
Synthese, forthcoming 
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tive,
22
 the weak one thinks of this perspective as a feature of the context of use 
(the relevant perspective is that of the community of the speaker), while the strong 
one thinks of it as a feature of the context of assessment – there is no fact of the 
matter as to which perspective is the relevant one. 
The weak version of the relativism the non-factualist’s Kripkenstein is commit-
ted to is what is usually called “nonindexical contextualism”, while the strong 
version is what MacFarlane (2014, p. 73) calls “truth-value relativism”. I prefer 
“reality relativism” to “truth-value relativism” (even though I admit that it does 
not sound that good) because the dependence of a proposition’s truth value on the 
context of assessment is just a by-product of the dependence on such a context of 
the circumstances of evaluation relevant to its assessment, and we can think of 
circumstances of evaluation as the theoretical counterpart of “reality” ‒ that 
against which we evaluate our claims. 
 
3. Relativism without Idealism 
Let us now take our argument’s second lemma. The apparatus I sketched allows 
us to distinguish six different ways to read it: 
 
Ambiguity theoretic reading: an utterance is correct only relative to a per-
spective because which character is associated to it (i.e., which logical form 
it is an utterance of) depends on the value of the perspective parameter in 
the context of use. 
Indexical contextualist reading: an utterance is correct only relative to a per-
spective because which t-distributions it expresses depends on the value of 
the perspective parameter in the context of use. 
Nonindexical contextualist reading: an utterance is correct only relative to a 
perspective because which circumstances of evaluation are relevant to its 
assessment depends on the value of the perspective parameter in the context 
of use. 
Meaning relativist reading: an utterance is correct only relative to a perspec-
tive because which character is associated to it depends on the value of the 
perspective parameter in the context of assessment. 
Proposition relativist reading: an utterance is correct only relative to a per-
spective because which t-distributions it expresses depends on the value of 
the perspective parameter in the context of assessment ‒ this is what 
MacFarlane (2014, p. 73) calls “content relativism”. 
                                                 
22
 The dependency of the truth value of a proposition(al radical) on a certain parameter is, 
of course, represented in our system by a dependency of the argument of the correspond-
ing t-distribution on that parameter, and the argument of a t-distribution is a circumstance 
of evaluation. 
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Reality relativist reading: an utterance is correct only relative to a perspec-
tive because which circumstances of evaluation are relevant to its assess-
ment depends on the value of the perspective parameter in the context of as-
sessment. 
 
The following table should help the reader see how these six options are related to 
each other: 
 
 Character T-distributions Circumstances 
of evaluation 
Context 
of use 
Ambiguity 
theoretic 
reading 
Indexical 
contextualist 
reading 
Nonindexical 
contextualist 
reading 
Context 
of assessment 
Meaning 
relativist 
reading 
Proposition 
relativist 
reading 
Reality 
relativist 
reading 
 
And now let me ask a question: which, among these six readings, make the se-
cond half of my regimentation of McDowell’s argument (from the second lemma 
onwards) sound? Well, take the meaning relativist reading. What this reading en-
tails, together with the fourth premise, is that sometimes an utterance U has mean-
ing M1, and hence expresses the true proposition P1, relative to context C1 and has 
meaning M2, and hence expresses the false proposition P2, relative to context C2. 
But this is not what the third lemma says. What this lemma says is that sometimes 
one and the same proposition is true relative to one context and false relative to 
another. Therefore, the meaning relativist reading renders the transition from the 
second to the third lemma, and a fortiori the argument’s second half, unsound. 
Mutatis mutandis, more or less the same holds for the other readings in the 
character and the t-distributions columns of the table above. Not so, however, for 
the nonindexical contextualist and the reality relativist readings, since these read-
ings do entail that sometimes one and the same proposition is true relative to a 
context and false relative to another. The answer to my question, therefore, is that 
the second half of my regimentation of McDowell’s argument is sound only if the 
non-factualist’s Kripkenstein is committed to either nonindexical contextualism or 
reality relativism not just with respect to meaning ascriptions but also with respect 
to language in general. And so the question now is: is either of these two readings 
the one we derived in the argument’s first half? 
The answer is, clearly enough, no. The second lemma, which is the conclusion 
of our argument’s first half, was derived – with the help of the third premise – 
from the first lemma, which ascribes to Kripkenstein the idea that an utterance has 
Synthese, forthcoming 
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a given meaning only relative to a perspective. And since, in our system, the theo-
retical counterpart of the concept of meaning is the notion of character, the only 
readings consistent with this fact are the ones in the character column of our table. 
This would be enough to show that McDowell’s argument fails. Its second half 
is sound only if we read the second lemma along the lines of either the 
nonindexical contextualist or the reality relativist reading; its first half is sound 
only if we read that lemma along the lines of either the ambiguity theoretic or the 
meaning relativist reading; hence, the argument as a whole is never sound. That 
being said, some other things are, I think, worth noting. 
First, the hypothesis that the view of language in general to which the non-
factualist version of Kripkenstein is committed is an ambiguity theory can, in fact, 
be ruled out. To see why, let us start with the hypothesis that Kripkenstein is a 
nonindexical contextualist about meaning ascriptions. On this hypothesis, 
Kripkenstein thinks that the truth value of the proposition The meaning of Jones’ 
utterance of “68 + 57 = 125” is M (“P”, for short) depends on the perspective of 
the utterer of the utterance expressing P – let us call this utterance “Umeaning”. But 
the proposition that p is true if and only if p. Therefore, Kripkenstein is committed 
to the idea that whether the meaning of Jones’ utterance of “68 + 57 = 125” 
(“Usum”, for short) is M or not depends on the perspective of the utterer of Umeaning. 
But, with respect to Usum, the utterer of Umeaning plays the role of the assessor. 
Hence, Kripkenstein is committed to the idea that whether the meaning of Usum is 
M or not depends on the perspective of the assessor of that utterance, and this is 
meaning relativism, not the ambiguity theory. And since, of course, we could have 
put any other utterance in place of Usum, this means that if he is a nonindexical 
contextualist about meaning ascriptions, then Kripkenstein must be a meaning rel-
ativist about language in general – meaning ascriptions included. 
Let us now turn to the hypothesis that Kripkenstein is a reality relativist about 
meaning ascriptions. On this hypothesis, Kripkenstein thinks that the truth value 
of P depends on the perspective of the assessor of Umeaning. But the proposition 
that p is true if and only if p. Therefore, Kripkenstein is committed to the idea that 
whether the meaning of Usum is M or not depends on the perspective of the asses-
sor of Umeaning. But if Williams is interested in assessing the truth value of Umeaning, 
she is ipso facto interested in assessing the meaning of Usum – after all, the mean-
ing of Usum is what Umeaning talks about; therefore, an assessor of Umeaning plays the 
role of the assessor with respect to Usum, too. Hence, Kripkenstein is once again 
committed to the idea that whether the meaning of Usum is M or not depends on 
the perspective of the assessor of that utterance: meaning relativism, not the am-
biguity theory. Therefore, Kripkenstein must be a meaning relativist about lan-
guage in general also on the assumption that he is a reality relativist about mean-
ing ascriptions. But (the non-factualist version of) Kripkenstein must be either a 
Synthese, forthcoming 
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nonindexical contextualist or a reality relativist about meaning ascriptions. Hence, 
he must be a meaning relativist about language in general.
23
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 And so, on the non-factualist/relativist reading Kripkenstein holds (or at least is com-
mitted to) the idea that (1) which character is associated to an utterance depends on the 
value of the perspective parameter in the context of assessment. But is this not incon-
sistent with the very notion that Kripkenstein maintains that (2) there is no fact of the 
matter as to what a given utterance means? Is not saying that an utterance’s character de-
pends on the context of assessment just saying that meaning facts have, as it were, more 
structure than we thought, rather than flat out denying that they exist? The answer is that 
no, it is not, since – as I have already stressed in section 2 – there is no “correct” context 
from which to assess a particular speech act. Saying that an utterance’s character depends 
on the context of assessment is not saying just that meaning facts have more structure 
than we thought; it is saying that, where we thought there were facts, there really are only 
opinions. That being said, a somewhat related objection deserves a more careful answer. 
The objection is that even though (1) and (2) are in principle consistent, maybe one (or 
more than one) of the arguments that support (2) can be adapted to refute (1). So far, I 
have tried to be as non-committal as possible about the details of the notion of a perspec-
tive; however, it is impossible to discuss this second objection without making this con-
cept a little bit more precise. Let us therefore identify a perspective with a set of disposi-
tions, which, in this context, strikes me as the most natural way to cash out the notion of a 
perspective. After all, when I first introduced the notion that Kripkenstein is a (reality) 
relativist about meaning ascriptions the idea was that the ground for saying that the prop-
osition Jones means addition by “+”is true relative to Smith’s perspective and false rela-
tive to Williams’ is that while the answers to particular addition problems Smith is in-
clined to give agree with Jones’, Williams’ do not. And it is quite natural to take the an-
swers Smith is inclined to give to be those he is disposed to give. This would make 
Kripkenstein’s view a form of dispositionalism; however, it is worth stressing that the 
relevant dispositions would be the assessor’s, which would make Kripkenstein’s brand of 
dispositionalism utterly different not only from classic semantic dispositionalism, but also 
from views such as McDowell’s – for the role of dispositions in McDowell’s view see 
McDowell 2009, p. 95; mutatis mutandis, the same holds for McDowell’s remarks con-
cerning the role of the linguistic community, for which see, e.g., McDowell 1991, p. 315. 
Anyway, if we identify perspectives with sets of dispositions, the objection becomes that 
maybe one of the arguments that refute less idiosyncratic varieties of semantic 
dispositionalism can be adapted to refute (1), too. Well, as far as I can see, the main ar-
guments against semantic dispositionalism one finds in the literature are (I) Kripke’s Ar-
gument from Finitude and Mistake, (II) what we may call “the Ought Argument” (i.e. 
Kripke’s Normativity Argument as rendered in, e.g., Glüer and Wikforss 2009), (III) 
what we may call “the Non-Inferential Knowledge Argument” (i.e. Kripke’s Normativity 
Argument as rendered in, e.g., Zalabardo 1997 and Guardo 2014), and, finally, (IV) the 
Privileging Problem (for which see, e.g., Bird and Handfield 2008 and Guardo 2012b, pp. 
206-207). Now, my view on the matter is that (I) fails against ideal-condition disposition-
al analyses (since I no longer accept the argument I gave in Guardo 2012b, § 3), while (II) 
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Second, note that – since t-distributions are the values of characters – meaning 
relativism entails proposition relativism. Therefore, if Kripkenstein is a global 
meaning relativist, he must be a global proposition relativist, too – even though, as 
it were, only derivatively. Taken together with what I said about the relation be-
tween nonindexical contextualism about meaning ascriptions and meaning relativ-
ism about language in general, this means that nonindexical contextualism about 
meaning ascriptions entails proposition relativism about language in general – and 
so, a fortiori, that these two views are compatible. On this point, I suspect I disa-
gree with MacFarlane (2014, pp. 73-74), who seems to think that a global proposi-
tion (or content) relativism would entail truth-value (or reality) relativism about 
meaning ascriptions and, therefore, that global proposition relativism is incompat-
ible with nonindexical contextualism about these constructions. 
Finally, a methodological remark. If the non-factualist reading is correct, 
Kripke’s Wittgenstein is either a nonindexical contextualist or a reality relativist 
about meaning ascriptions. This might seem to entail that Kripkenstein is commit-
ted to either an unrestricted reality relativism or a global nonindexical 
contextualism and, therefore, to some form of subjective idealism. However, I 
have shown that this is not the case: the general view about language Kripkenstein 
is committed to is what I called “meaning relativism”, the idea that which mean-
ing is to be assigned to a given utterance depends on the context of assessment. 
Now, nobody doubts that ambiguity and indexicality are widespread phenomena; 
nonindexical contextualism and reality relativism have been advocated with re-
gard to predicates of personal taste, knowledge attributions, epistemic modals, etc; 
and even proposition relativism has found some supporters (see, e.g., Sweeney 
2014). On the other hand, meaning relativism, not to say an unrestricted meaning 
relativism such as (the non-factualist’s) Kripkenstein’s, at least to my knowledge, 
                                                                                                                                     
is at the very least invalid (see Guardo 2012a, pp. 374-375); as for (III), the point of this 
argument is that if we analyze meaning in terms of dispositions we make a mystery of our 
non-inferential knowledge of what we mean, and (1) is not an attempt to analyze meaning 
in terms of dispositions: the idea is, rather, that there is no fact of the matter as to what we 
mean; finally, the point of (IV) is that there is no principled, non-question-begging reason 
to identify what I mean by “+” with my disposition to give certain answers in conditions 
X rather than with my disposition to give certain other answers in conditions Y – and 
such a problem does not even arise with regard to (1), for according to (1) any set of dis-
positions (mine or someone else’s) is as good as any other. (Note that while in the case of 
(I) and (II) my answer is that I am skeptical that these arguments can really refute classic 
semantic dispositionalism and so I do not see any reason to think that they can refute 
meaning relativism, in the case of (III) and (IV) my point is just that they cannot be 
adapted to refute meaning relativism, which is not to say that they do not work against 
classic semantic dispositionalism – and, in fact, I suspect they both do). 
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has never been either advocated or discussed in the technical and empirically ori-
ented literature, which might give rise to suspicions about the theoretical respect-
ability of such a position. 
I think that such suspicions are uncalled for. Context-dependency is visible on-
ly when the relevant parameter takes different values. The context-dependency of 
“I” is visible only because there are plenty of speakers. But all human beings have 
pretty much the same linguistic dispositions – and, from an evolutionary point of 
view, this is far from strange, since such an agreement is clearly a precondition of 
communication (see, e.g., Guardo forthcoming). The answers Smith is inclined to 
give to particular addition problems pretty much agree with Jones’, and when they 
disagree Smith and Jones can at least be interpreted as following the same proce-
dure. What I dubbed the “perspective” parameter rarely, if ever, takes different 
values. The context-dependency isolated by Kripkenstein is, therefore, almost per-
fectly invisible. And if this context-dependency is invisible, it is not strange that it 
is ignored in the empirically oriented literature. 
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